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legislative history does not provide clear guidance regarding
the treatment of exempt assets for purposes of the insolvency
definition.24  The Service, in a surprising move, stated that if
the U.S. Supreme Court hasn't acknowledged or relied upon a
position, a judicial position need not be considered in
interpreting a statutory rule.25  The Service also pointed out
that when Congress intended to exclude state-exempt assets,
as in the Bankruptcy Code, it did so specifically.26
Finally, the Service pointed out that the revocation of the
1991 letter ruling27 applied to all open years under the statute
of limitations unless IRS uses its discretionary authority28 to
limit the retroactive effect of the revocation.29  The Service
did not use the occasion to limit the retroactive effect.
Additional move
In a Field Service Advice letter ruling,30 issued six days
after the key letter ruling signaling a change in position on
the insolvency calculation,31 IRS took the position that assets
owned in tenancy by the entirety by the taxpayer and spouse
(where the spouse was not an obligor on the obligation in
question) should be included in determining whether the
taxpayer falls within the insolvency exception to the
recognition of discharge of indebtedness income.32  The
reasoning in the FSA paralleled the reasoning in the letter
ruling indicating a change in the Service position33 and, in
addition, noted that the wide disparity among state exemption
statutes, particularly with respect to the residence, results in
non-uniformity of tax treatment among taxpayers.34
In conclusion
The key question is whether the new Service position will
stand up in court.  That seems doubtful in light of nearly 60
years of court decisions which have held to the contrary.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The Chapter 12 debtor was a farmer who
grew strawberries and other fruits on a 30 acre parcel which
included the debtor’s residence. The debtor claimed the parcel
as an exempt rural homestead. The debtor had filed a liability
lawsuit against a fungicide manufacturer, alleging that the
fungicide contaminated the land so as to prevent the raising of
fruit crops on the land.  The parties reached a settlement  and
the debtor had received or would receive a substantial payment
for damages to the debtor’s farm. The debtor used some of the
proceeds, and planned to ultimately use all of the proceeds, for
the rehabilitation of the farm. The debtor included the
settlement proceeds in the rural homestead exemption, arguing
that the settlement proceeds represented proceeds form the
involuntary conversion of the farm. The court held that the
settlement proceeds were included in the homestead exemption
because the proceeds resulted from the involuntary conversion
of the property and were to be used for the rehabilitation of the
property. In re Gilley, 236 B.R. 441 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
SECURED CLAIMS . The Chapter 12 debtor was a farmer
who grew strawberries and other fruits on a 30 acre parcel
which included the debtor’s residence. The farm was subject to
a mortgage held by the FSA. The debtor had filed a liability
lawsuit against a fungicide manufacturer, alleging that the
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fungicide contaminated the land so as to prevent the raising of
the fruit crops on the land.  The parties reached a settlement
and the debtor had received or would receive a substantial
payment for damages to the debtor’s farm. The debtor used
some of the proceeds, and planned ultimately to use all of the
proceeds, for the rehabilitation of the farm. The debtor argued
that the mortgage did not attach to the settlement proceeds
because the proceeds were personal property of the debtor. The
court held that the settlement proceeds were subject to the
mortgage because (1) the lender had a right to bring or join in
the lawsuit which alleged damage to the collateral property,
making the settlement proceeds an interest in the mortgaged
property and (2) the lender was entitled to an equitable lien on
the proceeds, arising under the mortgage which provided that
the debtor could not impair the collateral. In r  Gilley, 236
B.R. 448 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
CONTRACTS
ARBITRATION CLAUSE.  The plaintiff entered into
contracts to purchase grass seed from the defendant. The
contract involved a specific amount of seed which was
delivered and paid for. The plaintiff, however, needed more
seed and arranged for the defendant to purchase more seed as
needed to fill orders sent to it by the plaintiff. The defendant
would then send invoices to the plaintiff along with bills of
lading as proof of shipment. The defendant submitted several
invoices without bills of lading which the plaintiff refused to
pay. The original large contract had an arbitration clause and
the defendant sought arbitration of the disputed invoices. The
defendant argued that the individual orders filled after the main
contract was completed were extensions of the main contract
and governed by the arbitration clause. The court held that the
smaller orders were not related to the original contract because
they occurred after the main contract had been fully performed
by both parties. The court also held that the orders were not
completed contracts because the plaintiff had not signed any of
the orders and the defendant had not complied with the
provision to submit bills of lading. Since the orders were not
completed contracts, the orders had no enforceable arbitration
clause under which the defendant could force the disputes to be
resolved through arbitration. Lebanon Chemical Corp. v.
United Farmers, 179 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 1999)
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY.  A corporation owned
several hog confinement facilities which produced farrow-to-
finish feeder pigs to the corporation’s shareholders’ family
farm corporations. The corporation wanted to build a new
larger feedlot and to expand several existing feedlots within
two counties. The corporation applied for and obtained an
Environmental Assessment Worksheet (EAW) from the
defendant state pollution control agency (PCA) which
determined that the corporation did not need to submit an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the construction. The
plaintiffs argued that the PCA ruling was arbitrary and
capricious in failing to require the EIS. The court first
d er ined that all of the projects had to be considered as one
project because the projects were connected by ownership and
close proximity. The court held that the PCA issuance of
permits to three of the sites prior to the EAW determination
indicated that the PCA failed to combine the projects for the
EAW d termination. The court also held the EAW
termination to be arbitrary and capricious in that the PCA
failed to r quire modeling for hydrogen sulfide emissions even
though such modeling had been required for a previous feedlot
construction permit and the modeling was available and
inexpensive. Pope County Mothers v. MPCA, 594 N.W.2d
233 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COTTON. The FSA has adopted as final regulations which
remove the requirement that all electronic warehouse receipts
for cotton must be issued as single bale receipts. The rule will
thereby allow warehouse operators to issue single and multiple
bale warehouse receipts as either paper or electronic warehouse
receipts. 64 Fed. Reg. 54508 (Oct. 7, 1999).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC and the FSA have issued
proposed regulations providing procedures for federal crop
insurance program participant appeals of adverse decisions
made by the Risk Management Agency. 64 Fed. Reg. 52678
(Sept. 30, 1999), adding 7 C.F.R. § 400.90–400.97.
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The decedent’s estate
included property in a revocable trust which was declared a
superfund site by the EPA. On the decedent’s death the
decedent’s business, a landfill operation, and the EPA were in
negotiations as to the decedent’s liability for the cleanup of the
property. The estate estimated the cleanup costs at $30 million
and deducted that amount from the decedent’s estate, resulting
in a negative value for the estate. The IRS disallowed the
deduction as too speculative. The estate and EPA reached a
settlement for $750,000 for the cleanup and the estate filed an
amended return claiming that amount as a deduction. The IRS
argued that, because the property was not included in the
probate estate and the probate estate was valued at less than the
settlement amount, no deduction was allowed. The court held
that the statute, I.R.C. § 2053(c)(2), does not limit deductions
to claims against only the probate estate but only limits
deduc io s to the value of the gross estate. Because the
property was included in the gross estate, the EPA cleanup
claim against it was deductible. Estate of Snyder v. United
States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,357 (Fed. Cls. 1999).
IRA . The taxpayer had formed a tax-exempt private
foundation. The taxpayer owned an IRA and made the
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foundation one of the designated beneficiaries of the IRA. The
IRS ruled that the IRA would be included in the taxpayer’s
estate, the estate would be eligible for a charitable deduction
for the value of the IRA interest which passed to the
foundation, and the IRA would be income in respect of
decedent as to the foundation and not the taxpayer’s estate. Ltr.
Rul. 9939039, June 30, 1999.
VALUATION . The decedent and a brother each owned half
of the stock of a corporation. The decedent and brother
transferred 55 percent of their stock to a family limited
partnership in exchange for general and limited partnership
interests. At the same time the partnership issued limited
partnership interests to the decedent’s four children. The
decedent and brother retained the voting rights for the stock
transferred to the partnership. The IRS ruled that the valuation
of the stock and partnership interests was subject to I.R.C. §
2036 because the decedent did not receive full consideration for
the stock, since some of the partnership interests were
transferred to the children, and the decedent retained the voting
rights of the stock. Ltr Rul. 9938005, June 7, 1999.
FARM ESTATE & BUSINESS PLANNING
By Neil E. Harl
The 14th Edition of this popular softcover book provides lay
level guidance on farm estate and business planning concepts
and planning pointeres for farmers and ranchers. The book is
updated to 1999 and contains the latest one the family-owned
business deduction which was amended substantially in 1998.
The book may be ordered by contacting Doane Agricultural
Services, 11701 Borman Dr., Suite 100, St. Louis, MO 63146.
Ph. 1-800-535-2342.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
APPEALS . The IRS has issued an announcement about the
appeals customer service representatives, including a list of the
duties of all representatives and a listing of the phone numbers
of the regional offices. Ann. 99-98, I.R.B. 1999-__.
CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3].*
DEFINITION. An LLC owned another entity formed under
the laws of another country. The ruling does not identify the
nature of the entity. The LLC and the entity intended to treat
the entity as not separate from the LLC but failed to timely
make the election under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). The IRS
granted the parties an extension to make the election. Ltr. Rul.
9939023, July 1, 1999.
DISASTER LOSSES. President Clinton on Sept. 18
determined that certain areas in New Jersey are eligible for
assistance from the federal government under the Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5121) as a
result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 16, 1999. Accordingly,
taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to the disaster
occur ing in the following counties may deduct the losses on
th ir 1998 federal income tax returns: Bergen, Passaic,
Somerset, Essex, Middlesex, Mercer, Morris and Union.
FEMA-1295-DR. On Sept. 19, the President determined that
cer in areas in New York are eligible for assistance under the
Act as a result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 16, 1999.
Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained losses in Orange,
Putnam, Rockland and Westchester counties may deduct the
losses on their 1998 returns. FEMA-1296-DR. The President
on Sept. 18, determined that certain areas in Pennsylvania are
eligible for assistance from the federal government under the
Act as a result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 16, 1999.
Accordingly, taxpayers who sustained losses attributable to the
disaster occurring in the following counties may deduct the
losses on their 1998 federal income tax return: Albany,
Dutchess, Greene, Rensselaer, Schenectady, Ulster, Bucks,
Chester, Delaware, Lancaster, Montgomery, Philadelphia and
York. FEMA-1294-DR. On Sept. 18, 1999 and as amended on
Sept. 20, the President determined that certain areas in Virginia
are eligible for assistance under the Act as a result of Hurricane
Floyd beginning on Sept. 13, 1999. Accordingly, taxpayers
who sustained losses in the cities of Colonial Heights City,
Franklin, Hampton, Petersburg City, Portsmouth, Newport
News, Norfolk, Virginia Beach and the counties of Accomack,
Isle of Wight, James City, Lancaster, Northumberland, Prince
George County, Southampton, Surry, Sussex and York may
deduct the losses on their 1998 returns. FEMA-1293-DR. The
President on Sept. 9, 1999, determined that certain areas in
North Carolina are eligible for assistance from the federal
government under the Act  as a result of Hurricane Dennis on
Aug. 29, 1999. Accordingly, taxpayers in the counties of
Beaufort, Carteret, Craven, Dare, Hyde and Pamlico who
sustained a loss attributable to the disaster may deduct the loss
on their 1998 federal income tax return. FEMA-1291-DR. On
Sept. 1, 1999, the President determined that certain areas in
Pennsylvania are eligible for assistance from the federal
government under the Act as a result of severe storms and
flooding on Aug. 20-21, 1999. Taxpayers in Juniata County
who sustained a loss attributable to the disaster may deduct the
loss on their 1998 federal income tax return. FEMA-1289-DR.
The President on Sept. 23 determined that certain areas in
Connecticut are eligible for assistance from the federal
government under the Act as a result of high winds, heavy rain
and flooding associated with Tropical Storm Floyd that began
on Sept. 16, 1999. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a
loss attributable to the disaster occurring in Fairfield and
Hartford counties may deduct the loss on his or her 1998
federal income tax return. FEMA-1302-DR. On Sept. 24, the
President determined that certain areas in Maryland are eligible
for assistance under the Act as a result of Hurricane Floyd,
beginning on Sept. 16, 1999. Taxpayers in the following
counties may deduct related losses on their 1998 returns: Anne
Arundel, Calvert, Caroline, Cecil, Charles, Harford, Kent,
Queen Anne's Somerset, St. Mary's and Talbot. FEMA-1303-
DR. The President on Sept. 22, determined that certain areas in
New Mexico are eligible for assistance from the federal
government under the Act as a result of severe storms and
flooding that began on July 16, 1999. Taxpayers who sustained
losses ttributable to the disaster in the following counties may
deduct them on their 1998 returns: Dona Ana, Luna, Mora, Rio
Arriba, San Juan, Sandoval and Sierra, and the Mescalero
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Apache Reservation. FEMA-1301-DR. The President on Sept.
18, 1999, determined that certain areas in Virginia are eligible
for assistance from the federal government under the Act as a
result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 13, 1999. Accordingly,
taxpayers in the counties of Chesterfield, Greensville, King and
Queen, Middlesex, Dinwiddie, Gloucester, Halifax and
Mathews and the cities of Chesapeake, Emporia, Richmond,
Suffolk and Williamsburg who sustained a loss attributable to
the disaster may deduct the loss on their 1998 federal income
tax return. FEMA-1293-DR. Also on Sept. 18, 1999, the
President determined that certain areas in New Jersey are
eligible for assistance from the federal government under the
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 USC 5121)
as a result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 16, 1999. Taxpayers in
Hunterdon County who sustained a loss attributable to the
disaster may deduct the loss on their 1998 federal income tax
return. FEMA-1295-DR. On Sept. 19, 1999, the President
determined that certain areas in New York are eligible for
assistance from the federal government under the Act as a
result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 16, 1999. Taxpayers in
Essex County who sustained a loss attributable to the disaster
may deduct the loss on their 1998 federal income tax return.
FEMA-1296-DR. The President on Sept. 21, 1999, determined
that certain areas in Delaware are eligible for assistance from
the federal government under the Act as a result of Hurricane
Floyd on Sept. 15-17, 1999. Accordingly, taxpayers in New
Castle County who sustained a loss attributable to the disaster
may deduct the loss on their 1998 federal income tax return.
FEMA-1297-DR. Finally, also on Sept. 21, 1999, the President
determined that certain areas in South Carolina are eligible for
assistance from the federal government under the Act as a
result of Hurricane Floyd on Sept. 14, 1999. Taxpayers in the
counties of Charleston, Georgetown, Horry, Beaufort,
Berkeley, Colleton, Jasper, Marion and Williamsburg who
sustained a loss attributable to the disaster may deduct the loss
on their 1998 federal income tax return. FEMA-1299-DR.
EARNED INCOME CREDIT . The taxpayer was
incarcerated in prison and received only gifts from family and
friends during the tax year. The taxpayer received no wages
from working at the prison. The taxpayer claimed the gifts as
income from the occupation of begging. The court held that the
taxpayer was not entitled to any earned income tax credit
because the taxpayer had no income for the tax years involved.
Bauta v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-317.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer owned and operated a grain
and livestock farm. Most of the crop land was leased to third
parties or enrolled in federal set-aside programs. The taxpayer
and a friend established display gardens on the property which
were open during part of the year to the public for a charge.
The court applied the following factors to determine whether
the display garden activity could be grouped with the farming
activity: (1) whether the undertakings shared a close
organizational and economic relationship, (2) whether the
undertakings were conducted at the same place, (3) whether the
undertakings were part of the taxpayer's efforts to find sources
of revenue from the land, (4) whether the undertakings were
formed as separate businesses, (5) whether one undertaking
benefited from the other, (6) whether the taxpayer used one
undertaking to advertise the other, (7) the degree to which the
undertakings shared management, (8) the degree to which one
caretaker oversaw the assets of both undertakings, (9) whether
the taxpayer used the same accountant for the undertakings, and
(10) he degree to which the undertakings shared books and
records. The court held that the activities could be grouped
because (1) the farm and display gardens had a close
org izational and economic relationship, (2) both
undertakings were conducted at the taxpayer's farm, and both
were a tempts to make the farm profitable, (3) the taxpayer
used the farmland for both undertakings, (4) the taxpayer
cr ated and developed the gardens in an attempt to replace
tobacco as the farm's main cash crop, (5) both the gardens and
the farm required the planting, tending, and harvesting of plants
or crops, (6) the taxpayer managed both undertakings as one
activity, (8) the farm and gardens shared the same employees
and equipment, (9) the same accountant was used for both
undertakings, and (10) the taxpayer used the same checking
account and books for the farm and gardens and reported both
und rtakings on one Schedule F in each of the years in issue.
Tobin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-328.
The taxpayers rented a small farm and operated a horse
boarding activity on the farm. The taxpayers owned two horses
for their use and claimed to have provided boarding services for
several other horse owners; however, the taxpayer provided
few records to substantiate the boarding activity income and
expenses. The court held that the activity was not entered into
with the intent to make a profit because (1) the taxpayers did
not provide evidence of their involvement in the activity
beyond caring for their own horses, (2) the activity never made
a profit and the taxpayers had no plan to ever make a profit, (3)
the taxpayers did not keep full and accurate records, (4) the
taxpayers did not have any expertise or experience in operating
a horse boarding activity, and (5) the taxpayer received much
personal pleasure from the activity. Hudnall v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-326.
INCOME AVERAGING . The IRS has issued proposed
regulations governing the income averaging provisions for
farmers. The proposed regulations provide that the term
“farming business” has the same meaning as provided in I.R.C.
§ 263A(e)(4) and the regulations thereunder. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1301-1(b). The proposed regulations also provide that
an individual engaged in a farming business includes a sole
proprietor of a farming business, a partner of a partnership
engaged in a farming business, and a shareholder of an S
corporation engaged in a farming business. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1301-1(b). The proposed regulations provide that farm
inc me includes all income, deductions, gains, and losses
at ributable to an individual's farming business. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1301-1(e). An individual may designate what type,
and how much of each type, of farm income is to be treated as
elected farm income. The elected farm income may not exceed
an ind vidual's taxable income. In addition, elected farm
income from net capital gain attributable to a farming business
may not exceed total net capital gain. One-third of each type of
elec ed farm income is then allocated to each base year. The
prop sed regulations provide that a farm income averaging
election is made by filing Schedule J, Farm Income Averaging,
with n individual's timely filed federal income tax return
(including extensions). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-1(c). In
general, the proposed regulations provide that if an individual
has an adjustment for an election year or base year, the
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individual may also make a late farm income averaging
election or change or revoke a previous election. An adjustment
is any change in taxable income or tax liability that is permitted
to be made by filing an amended Federal income tax return, or
a change in taxable income or tax liability resulting from an
IRS examination. If there is no adjustment for an election year
or a base year, a late election, change, or revocation may be
made only with the consent of the Commissioner. The
proposed regulations provide that the allocation of elected farm
income to the base years does not affect any determination
(other than the calculation of the I.R.C. § 1 tax attributable to
the elected farm income) with respect to the election year or the
base years. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-1(c). The proposed
regulations provide that calculation of the I.R.C. § 1 tax on
elected farm income allocated to a base year is to be made
without any additional adjustments or determinations with
respect to that year. The next issue of the Digeswill publish an
article by Neil Harl on these new regulations.  64 Fed. Reg.
54836 (Oct. 8, 1999), adding Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1301-1.
INVOLUNTARY EXCHANGES . The taxpayer owned
property in Alaska which was subject to condemnation by the
state. The taxpayer rejected the state’s settlement offer and the
issue of valuation was settled in the courts in the taxpayer’s
favor. State law provided for interest to be paid where a
settlement offer is rejected and the rejection is upheld in court.
The taxpayer argued that the condemnation award was entirely
a payment for the property without any interest paid. The court
held that the evidence was undisputed that the condemnation
award included interest for the delay of payment of the original
settlement; therefore, the amount allocated to interest was
included in the taxpayer’s income, whether or not the taxpayer
used the entire proceeds to purchase replacement property in
order to qualify for I.R.C. § 1031 treatment. The opinion is
designated as not for publication. Vezey v. United States, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,863 (9th Cir. 1999).
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayers owned several
partnerships and S corporations. Several ranch properties were
acquired, with the land acquired by one of the taxpayer’s oil
companies and a ranch partnership acquiring the ranch
operating assets. The oil company then exchanged the ranch
property for tax depreciated oil and gas leases owned by the
taxpayers’ oil and gas partnership in a like-kind exchange. The
properties were distributed to the oil and gas partnership’s
partners who then contributed the properties to the ranch
partnership. The IRS disallowed the step-up of basis for the oil
and gas leases acquired in the first like-kind exchange and
treated the transaction as if the ranch partnership had acquired
the land in the initial purchase along with the operating assets.
The court upheld the IRS determination, holding that the
various transactions had no economic purpose except to give
the oil and gas leases a tax basis. The court noted that the
purchase of ranch land by an oil and gas company had no
purpose since the company did not obtain any mineral rights.
True v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,872
(10th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,869
(D. Wyo. 1997).
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE . The taxpayer was a retired
attorney. The taxpayer had purchased malpractice insurance in
the year of retirement to protect the taxpayer from malpractice
claims for services provided before retirement. The taxpayer
d ducted the entire premium paid for the insurance in the tax
year in which the premium was paid. The IRS argued that the
insuranc  policy was a capital asset with a substantial future
benefit and had to be amortized. The court held that, whether or
not the policy was a capital asset, the taxpayer was allowed to
deduct the entire cost of the policy in the year the taxpayer
ceased doing business. Steger v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. No. 18
(1999).
MILEAGE DEDUCTION . The standard mileage rate for
1999 is 32.5 cents per mile for business use, 14 cents per mile
for charitable use and 10 cents per mile for medical and moving
expense purposes. Rev. Proc. 99-38, I.R.B. 1999-__.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM  § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The IRS has
acquiesced in the result in the following case. The taxpayer was
a partner with the taxpayer's spouse in a business. The spouse
had declared bankruptcy and the IRS had issued a deficiency
notice to both parties disallowing some partnership losses and
credits. The nondebtor spouse argued that the deficiency notice
was defective because it involved partnership items and the IRS
did not comply with the partnership administrative adjustment
rules. The IRS argued that the rules did not apply because one
partn r was in bankruptcy. The court held that the bankruptcy
rule did not apply to the nondebtor partner and that the
deficiency notice was invalid as to the nondebtor partner for
failure to comply with the partnership administrative
adjustment procedures. Dubin v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 325
(1992), acq. in result only, I.R.B. 1999-__.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayers, husband
and wife, owned a commercial building and leased the building
to a personal service corporation owned and operated by one of
the taxpayers as a law office. The taxpayers claimed the rental
income as passive activity income and offset the income
against other passive activity losses. The IRS denied the offset
under Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6), which provided that rental
income was not passive if it came from the leasing of property
to a business in which the taxpayer materially participated. The
taxp yers argued that the regulation was not authorized by the
statute. T e court held that the legislative history of I.R.C. §
469 indicated Congressional intent that such a regulation could
be promulgated to prevent converting nonpassive income into
passive income by leasing property to a related entity. Fransen
v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,882 (5th
Cir. 1999), aff’g, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,776 (E.D.
La. 1998).
PENSION PLANS . For plans beginning in September 1999,
the weighted average is 6.00 percent with the permissible range
of 5.40 to 6.30 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range)
and 5.40 to 6.60 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range)
for purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 99-49, I.R.B. 1999-39, 436.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the publication of
Publication 1437 (Rev. October 1999), Procedures for
Electronic and Magnetic Media Filing of U.S. Income Tax
Returns for Estates and Trusts, Form 1041 for Tax Year 1999
and Publication 3112 (1999), E-File Application Package
which enables taxpayers to file their individual income tax
returns electronically. The documents are available at no charge
and can be obtained either (1) by calling the IRS's toll-free
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telephone number, 1-800-829-3676; (2) via the internet at
http://www.irs.gov/prod/cover.html; (3) through FedWorld on
the internet; or (4) by directly accessing the Internal Revenue
Information Services bulletin board at (703) 321-8020.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT INCOME . The taxpayers, husband
and wife operated a farm which was incorporated. The
corporation rented land from the taxpayers, the husband’s
father and third parties. The corporation entered into an
employment agreement with the taxpayers to operate the farm,
specifying the same duties performed by the taxpayers before
incorporation. The agreement provided that monetary
compensation was subject to FICA and income tax
withholding. The corporation provided a medical
reimbursement plan and medical insurance for the taxpayers.
On the taxpayers’ joint returns, the rental income was reported
on Schedule E, the wages were reported on Form 1040 as
wages and the earnings from the corporation were reported as
income. The taxpayers did not withhold federal or state income
taxes but the corporation withheld FICA and Medicare taxes.
The court held that the rental income was included in the
taxpayers’ net self-employment income because the taxpayers
performed their services for the farm under an arrangement and
materially participated in the farm operation. McNamara v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-333.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer served in a temporary
appointment as a state supreme court justice. The taxpayer was
required to reside in the state capitol four days a week and
returned to the taxpayer’s residence in another city for the other
three days. The court held that the taxpayer’s home was in the
state capitol and the taxpayer could not deduct the cost of
travel, meals and board associated with that employment. The
court distinguished the case of United States v. LeBlanc, 278
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1960), in which the taxpayer, also a supreme
court justice, was required by the constitution to maintain a
residence in the taxpayer’s home district. In this case, the
taxpayer’s maintenance of the residence in another city was not
required by state law. Robertson v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,875 (5th Cir. 1999).
UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME . The taxpayers were
university alumni associations which provided lists of alumni
names and addresses to a credit card company which issued
credit cards with the university logos on them. The credit card
company paid the taxpayers a percentage of the credit
purchases made with the cards and for the lists. The taxpayers
performed only a few hours of work preparing the lists each
year and in contacts with the credit card company. The IRS
argued that the income was unrelated business income because
the taxpayers performed some services for the income. The IRS
did not argue that the portion of the income paid for services
was unrelated business income. The court held that the test was
whether the substantial income was paid for the services and
lists provided by the taxpayers or for the use of the school
logos and emblems. The court held that the income was
royalties because the income far exceeded the value of the
services and lists provided by the taxpayers. Oregon State
University Alumni Association, Inc. v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,879 (9th Cir. 1999).
VETERINARIANS
MALPRACTICE. The plaintiff owned several horses which
allegedly were injured or killed after being treated by the
defend nt veterinarian. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
used unsanitary procedures or the wrong medications, resulting
in the loss of the animals and emotional distress to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sued for actual damages, loss of profits and
emotional distress damages. The court acknowledged that an
action for emotional distress has been allowed by courts in the
situati n where the intentional killing of an animal was proven.
However, the court held that, because horses were personal
property, no action would be allowed for emotional distress
resulting from negligent harming of an animal. The defendant
had sought summary judgment on the issue of whether the
defendant’s care had met the professional standard of care for
veterinarians. The court found that the defendant had not
provided any evidence of the professional standard of care nor
evidence of the defendant’s actions which met that standard.
The court held that summary judgment was not proper because
the defendant had not provided a prima facie case that the
defendant met the professional standard of care of treatment of
the horses. Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884 (Neb.
1999).
ZONING
HOG CONFINEMENT FACILITY.  The plaintiff sought to
construct a 5,000 head hog confinement facility within the
defendant township. A township ordinance required a permit to
construct the facility and the township notified the plaintiff that
a permit was required. The plaintiff had obtained state and
county permits but did not obtain a township permit. The court
held that the validity of the township ordinance required an
express grant of authority for the ordinance under S.D. Code §
8-2-1(4) because all police powers were reserved by the state
unless expressly granted by the legislature to a township. The
court also held that zoning powers were not expressly granted
to townships under the statute. The court held that the
ordinance was a zoning regulation because the ordinance
attempted to regulate the location and uses of buildings for
trade. Th  court concluded that the ordinance was an
unauthorized zoning regulation and allowed the plaintiff to
build the feedlot without the permit required by the ordinance.
Welsh v. Centerville Township, 595 N.W.2d 622 (S.D. 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
Koramba Farmers & Graziers No. 1 v. Comm’r, 177 F.3d
14 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff’g, 110 T.C. 445 (1998) (soil and water
conservation expenses) see p. 95 su ra.
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4th Annual
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000
Royal Lahaina Resort, Kaanapali Beach, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Celebrate the Millenium by leaving winter behind and spending a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand Kaanapali beach and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-
class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A. McEowen.  The
seminar is scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina Resort on the island of
Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with plenty of time to golf,
play tennis or just lie in the warm Hawaian sun. A continental breakfast and break refreshments for each day are
included in the registration fee,  Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page seminar manual, Farm
Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior to the seminar. A CD-ROM
version will also be available for a small additional charge.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business  deduction
(FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of
both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited
liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights at a
busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal
Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law
Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Subscribers should have received their brochure.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for this seminar or want to register.
